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Article 7

Requests for Admission in Illinois: No Longer a Trap
for the Unwary
S. JarretRaab*
After years of increasing controversy surrounding the strict and
oftentimes inequitable application of the rules governing requests for
admission, the Supreme Court of Illinois recently overruled a series of
appellate decisions that created what had become a procedural trap for
the unwary.' In Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, the Supreme Court
not only clarified the purpose and scope of requests for admission in
Illinois, but it attempted to ameliorate the harsh results arising out of the
improper application of Illinois Supreme Court Rules 183 and 216.2
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURAL LAW REGULATING RESPONSES TO
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION

In Illinois, as with most other jurisdictions, an untimely or
procedurally defective response to a formal request to admit will result
in factual admissions that can have dire consequences to the offending
party's case. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216 ("Rule 216") provides, in
pertinent part: "A party may serve on any other party a written request
for the admission by the latter of the truth of any specified relevant fact
set forth in the request." 3 If the served party fails to properly respond
under oath within twenty-eight days, the request is deemed a factual
admission that cannot be contradicted at a later date. 4 Under the rule,
"[s]uch an admission may properly form the basis of a grant of
summary judgment." 5 However, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 183 ("Rule 183"), a trial court may allow a party to respond to a

* Jarret Raab is a commercial litigator with the law firm Shaw Gussis Fishman Glantz
Wolfson & Towbin LLC in Chicago, Illinois. Comments or questions are welcome at
jraab@shawgussis.com or (312) 541-015 1.
1. See Robbins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 841 N.E.2d 22, 27 (I1. App. Ct. 2006), overruled by
Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 875 N.E.2d 1065 (Il1. 2007).
2. Vision Pointof Sale, Inc., 875 N.E.2d at 1081-82.
3. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 216(a).
4. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 216(c).
5. Robbins, 841 N.E.2d at 25.
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request for admission after the twenty-eight day deadline has expired if
6
the delinquent party can establish good cause for its noncompliance.
In 1995, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Bright v. Dicke set
the stage for the ensuing controversy surrounding the application of
Rule 183. In Bright, the Supreme Court considered whether a party was
entitled to an extension under Rule 183 simply because its untimely
response to a request for admission had no prejudicial effect on the
opposing party. 7 The court rejected this argument, finding that a party
moving for a Rule 183 extension must produce clear, objective reasons
why a time extension is warranted. 8 The court specifically held that the
"mere absence of inconvenience or prejudice to the opposing party is
not sufficient to establish good cause under Rule 183 .... The moving
party must assert some independent ground for why his untimely
response should be allowed." 9
In the years following Bright, the Illinois Appellate Court, through a
series of decisions, replaced the standard established in Bright with the
rule that
"mistake, inadvertence, or attorney neglect" on the part of the moving
party can never serve as the sole basis for establishing good cause to
support an extension [of time] pursuant to Rule 183. This, in turn,
means that ...unless the party can present evidence separate and apart
from mistake, inadvertence, or attorney neglect to support an
argument that there was good cause for the initial delay in compliance,
the extension will not be granted.l 0
Thus, the court of appeals transformed the narrow decision in Bright
into a broad and inflexible blanket rule which resulted in numerous
unfair and draconian results.
II. THE INEQUITABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE GOOD-CAUSE
REQUIREMENT UNDER RULE 183
The application of the Illinois appellate courts' post-Bright blanket
rule made it exceedingly difficult for parties to obtain extensions under
Rule 183. In fact, during the eleven-year period between Bright and

6. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 183 ("The court, for good cause shown on motion after notice to the
opposite party, may extend the time for filing any pleading or the doing of any act which is
required by the rules to be done within a limited period, either before or after the expiration of the
time."); Bright v. Dicke, 652 N.E.2d 275, 276 (I11.
1995) (determining whether the court can
allow a party to make late service of a response to a request to admit under Rule 183).
7. See Bright, 652 N.E.2d at 276 (discussing issues presented to lower courts).
8. Id. at 277 (holding that good cause is a prerequisite for relief).
9. Id.
10. Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 875 N.E.2d 1065, 1076 (Ill.
2007).
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Vision Point of Sale, there were no reported appellate decisions finding
"good-cause for allowing an untimely response to a request to admit." 1 1
However, the Illinois appellate courts' interpretation of Rule 183 had
a significant impact on litigation in Illinois. For example, in Robbins v.
Allstate, the Second District Appellate Court upheld summary judgment
against a pro se plaintiff because his timely but technically deficient
12
denials to requests for admission were treated as legal admissions.
The defendant insurance carrier in Robbins served the plaintiff with
multiple requests to admit shortly after the plaintiffs counsel had
withdrawn from the case. 13 The unrepresented plaintiff, who had
limited education, provided the defendant with typed and signed
responses denying each request. 14 The plaintiffs responses, however,
contained confusing handwritten notations next to each request and the
responses were not notarized. 15 The court ruled that handwritten
notations created ambiguity and thus, the plaintiffs responses were not
true denials. 16 Moreover, the court found that because the plaintiff
failed to properly verify his responses, they were inadequate under Rule
216 and must therefore be treated as admissions. 17 While the court was
sympathetic to the plaintiffs position, recognizing that Rule 216 could
be viewed as a "trap for the unwary," it refused to allow him to amend
his deficient responses, citing that mistake and ignorance of proper legal
procedure did not constitute good cause under Rule 183.18
Similarly, in Montalbano v. Rauschenberger, the court upheld
summary judgment against the plaintiff where he failed to respond to
the defendant's requests to admit. 19 The Montalbano court refused to
allow the plaintiff to file responses more than twenty-eight days after
service despite his claim that he never received the requests. 2° The
11. Id. at 1076 n.4 (quoting John J. Hynes, Admissions of Fact in Discovery: Avoiding the
Rule 216 Trap, 93 ILL. B.J. 402, 406 (2005)).
App. Ct. 2006) (holding that the rule
12. Robbins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 841 N.E.2d 22, 27 (I11.
involved here is somewhat technical, that the plaintiff was unrepresented at the time, and that he
may not have fully understood that the rules are irrelevant).
13. Id. at 24.
14. Id. Plaintiffs counsel was granted leave to withdraw from the case two months prior to
the requests for admission being served. Id.
15. Id. at 24-25. The typewritten response denied the allegation but the handwritten response
admitted it. Id.
16. Id. at 25 (stating that ambiguous responses cannot truly be deemed denials).
17. Id. (finding that a failure to respond to a request for admission results in an admission of
the facts contained in the request).
18. Id. at 26 (holding that mistake, inadvertence, and neglect are not valid bases for a finding
of good cause).
19. Montalbano v. Rauschenberger,794 N.E.2d 401, 407-08 (11. App. Ct. 2003).
20. Id. at 403.
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plaintiff argued that he first learned of the outstanding requests upon
receiving the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 2 1 The trial
court, on the other hand, ruled that the requests were presumed to have
been properly served because the defendant was in possession of a
signed certificate of service. 2 2 The appellate court concluded that the
plaintiffs claim that he never received the defendant's requests for
admission was insufficient to satisfy the good-cause standard under
Rule 183.23 Accordingly, the plaintiff was not permitted to respond to
the defendant's requests and, as a result, his suit was ultimately
dismissed. 24
III. THE GOOD-CAUSE STANDARD REVISITED

On September 20, 2007, the Supreme Court of Illinois revisited the
issue of good-cause under Rule 183 for the first time since issuing its
decision in Bright. In Vision Point of Sale, the Supreme Court clarified
which factors may be considered when determining whether good-cause
exists to remedy an unintentional noncompliance with a Rule 216.25
The Supreme Court further examined the legal basis for the good-cause
standard established by the appellate courts through its post-Bright
26
decisions.
In Vision Point of Sale, the trial court struck the plaintiffs timely
responses to sixty-five separate requests for admission as a result of two
perceived procedural deficiencies. 27 Here, the plaintiff provided the
defendant with timely written responses signed by his attorney, as well
as a separate properly executed verification which he himself signed.2 8
However, citing Moy v. Ng, the trial court found that the plaintiffs
failure to personally sign the final page of his discovery responses
violated Rule 216(c), thereby rendering them insufficient. 29 The trial
court further concluded that the plaintiffs failure to file his discovery
responses in accordance with Circuit Court of Cook County Rule

21. Id. at 404 (arguing that nonreceipt constituted good cause for an extension of the
deadline).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 407.
25. Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 875 N.E.2d 1065, 1076 (111.2007).
26. Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 852 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
27. Id. at 333.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 334 (citing Moy v. Ng, 793 N.E.2d 919 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)).
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("Cook County Rule") 3.1(c), constituted a procedural deficiency that
30
precluded the recognition of his denials.
The trial court initially denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to
amend his responses on the grounds that mistake and error did not
constitute good cause under Rule 183.31 However, after growing
frustrated with the defendant's repeated defiance of an unrelated
injunctive order, the trial court vacated its prior discovery order, sua
sponte, and permitted the plaintiff to amend his responses. 32 The trial
court justified its ruling by concluding that "under the totality of
circumstances in the case, good cause existed under Rule 183 for the
time extension." 33 The appellate court upheld the ruling, providing that
the circuit court may consider "any facts that bear on the balance the
trial court must strike between the need for efficient litigation and the
34
interest of achieving substantial justice between the parties."
The first issue addressed by the supreme court in Vision Point of Sale
was whether a trial court may consider facts and circumstances that go
beyond the reason for noncompliance when determining whether goodcause exists under Rule 183. 35 The supreme court answered this
question in the negative, reversing the appellate court.36 The supreme
court instead ruled that Illinois' trial courts may consider only those
facts and circumstances that explain why the delinquent party was
unable to meet the Rule 216 deadline.
Having firmly established the scope of information that can be
considered in making a good-cause determination, the supreme court
next evaluated the basis for the blanket rule employed by the appellate
court. 37 The supreme court, in a sharply worded opinion, clarified that
it has never held that "mistake, inadvertence, or attorney neglect"
should be excluded from consideration when determining good-cause
under Rule 183.38 In fact, it found that the blanket rule espoused by the
Illinois appellate courts runs directly counter to the well recognized
principle that cases should be resolved on their merits, rather than on
30. Vision Point of Sale, Inc., 852 N.E.2d at 333 (citing I11. Cir. Ct. Cook County, Rule
3.1(c)). Circuit Court Rule 3.1(c) mandates that requests to admit, and the corresponding
responses, be timely filed with the circuit courts.
31. Vision Point of Sale, Inc., 852 N.E.2d at 334.
32. Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 875 N.E.2d 1065, 1071 (I11.2007).
33. Id.
34. Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 852 N.E.2d 331, 337 (11. App. Ct. 2006).
35. Vision Point of Sale, Inc., 875 N.E.2d at 1075.
36. Id. at 1077.
37. Id. The blanket approach has proved to be an unworkable framework that is unduly
severe. Id.
38. Id.
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technicalities. 39 Accordingly, the supreme court overruled the entire
line of post-Bright cases following the unduly harsh blanket rule, and
held that trial courts should "consider all objective, 40relevant evidence..
why an extension of time should now be granted.
IV. EXAMINATION OF SIGNATURE AND FILING REQUIREMENTS

In addition to re-establishing the good-cause standard, the Illinois
Supreme Court examined the procedural requirements established in
Moy and the filing requirements set forth in Cook County Rule 3.1(c).
In Moy, the court of appeals held that "Rule 216(c) requires that the
party responding to the Rule 216 requests must sign the answer and
provide the sworn-to statement." 41 Thus, under Moy, a response to a
request for admission that lacks the litigant's actual signature (even if
properly verified) is deficient as a matter of law and does not constitute
a valid denial.42 Upon review, however, the Supreme Court found that:
There is nothing in Rule 216(c) which requires a party to both verify
and "sign" the final page of its denials to the requests to admit of an
opposing party.... Adding an unsworn signature to a document that is
already sworn to under oath
... does nothing to make that document
43
more binding or effective.

The supreme court concluded that Moy has no support in the law and
proceeded to overrule it. Accordingly, a properly verified discovery
response, with or without the litigant's signature, is now sufficient
under Rule 216.
Lastly, the supreme court considered the effect of a party's failure to
comply with the filing requirement contained in Cook County Rule 3.1
on the sufficiency of its response. As noted above, Cook County Rule
3.1(c) mandates that requests to admit and the corresponding responses
be timely filed with the circuit courts. 4 4 It has long been recognized

that a failure to comply with Cook County Rule 3.1(c) constitutes
grounds to invalidate and/or strike the party's responses.
While circuit courts in Illinois have authority to enact their own
procedural rules, such rules are subject to review by the supreme court

39. Id. at 1077-78 (citing Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., 692 N.E.2d 286 (1l. 1998)).
40. Id. at 1078.
41. Moy v. Ng, 793 N.E.2d 919, 925 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (emphasis added).
42. Id. Rule 216(c) requires that the party responding to the Rule 216 request must sign the
answer and provide the sworn-to statement and that the signed and sworn-to copy of the answer
served on the requesting party must be signed and swom-to by the party.
43. Vision Point of Sale, Inc., 875 N.E.2d at 1079-80.
44. ILL. CIR. CT. COOK COUNTY R. 3.1(c).
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and may not conflict with any of its established rules. 45 Moreover,
circuit courts are "without power to change substantive law or impose
additional substantive burdens upon litigants." 46 In Bright, the supreme
court found that service of a discovery response under Rule 216, rather
than filing, was the critical event.4 7 Noting that Rule 216 contains no
filing requirements, the supreme court held that when, and if, a response
is filed is largely irrelevant and has minimal legal significance. 48 The
court reaffirmed this principle in Vision Point of Sale and plainly stated
that a violation of Cook County Rule 3.1(c) "cannot form the basis for
striking a party's response to a Rule 216 request to admit." 4 9 Therefore,
this decision marks a significant departure from the general consensus
concerning the Cook County filing requirement.
CONCLUSION

Strict compliance with the rules governing discovery is a critical
aspect of successful litigation in Illinois, and this remains particularly
true with regard to requests for admission. While the failure to properly
comply with the procedural requirement set forth in Rule 216 can still
be fatal to a party's claim, the Supreme Court of Illinois' recent decision
in Vision Point of Sale has effectively scaled back the unduly harsh
requirements enforced by the trial courts in recent years. Vision Point
of Sale not only encourages a trial on the merits, but it should help
ensure that requests for admission no longer act as a procedural trap for
the unwary.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

ILL. SUP. CT. R. 21(a).
People ex rel. Brazen v. Finley, 519 N.E.2d 898, 901 (I11.1988).
Bright v. Dicke, 652 N.E.2d 275, 276 (I11.1995).
Id. (recognizing that Rule 216 contains no filing requirement).
Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 875 N.E.2d 1065, 1081 (111.2007).

